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Netvs.Gross Devaluation
inJune1966
OnJune 6, 1966, the rupee was devalued by 57.5 percent, computed as the
increase from Rs. 4.76 to Rs. 7.50 in the official rate on the dollar.1 The de-
valuation was accomplished by various other measures including, in particular,
a removal of the major export subsidy device—the import entitlement schemes
—and a significant reduction in import duties.
It is the purpose of this chapter to quantify the degree of effective devalu-
ation, when the parity change is adjusted for these and other changes in trade
subsidies and tariffs. We thus distinguish between the pure parity change,
which may be described as the "de jure," "gross," devaluation, and the "de
facto," "net" devaluation. Remember that we are adjusting only for the simul-
taneous changes in trade taxes and subsidies and not for the effects of other
measures such as import liberalization in the shape of larger (maintenance)
aid flows.
It is also necessary to note that the export subsidies were soon to be
revised and steadily increased through 1966—70, a process which we describe
and whose magnitude and effects we seek to quantify in later chapters. In the
present chapter, we confine our statistical• analysis to the net devaluation as of
June 6, 1966, when the formal parity change and the changes in the export
subsidization schemes and import duties were announced by the government
of India.
Exports.
Among the changes in export subsidies and duties which accompanied
the devaluation were:
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1. the imposition of a number of countervailing export duties on "tradi-
tional" exports, aimed at partially or wholly neutralizing the effect of devalu-
ation thereon on the assumption that India had monopoly power in trade in
these items;
2. the elimination of the import entitlement schemes, described in Chap-
ter 3, as well as the tax credits which had been granted in the 1963, 1964 and
1965 budgets; and
3. the elimination of a few cash subsidies which had been introduced in
the year preceding the devaluation on selected engineering goods.
EXPORT DUTIES
We analyze initially the impact of the imposition of the export duties.
Table 6—1 lists the exports on which the duties were levied at the time of the
devaluation. It is interesting to note that duties were levied on exports amount-
ing to as much as 62—63 percent of the overall export values. Thus an effort
was made to offset devaluation on a very wide front.
Table 6—1 lists, in columns (4) and (5),exportduties before and on
the date of devaluation. Since the duties were, for the most part, specific, they
had to be converted into effective ad valorem equivalents. The only way to
do this, in practice, is to take appropriate export unit values, f.o.b., for each
product and to relate the specific duty to them, converting the duty into an
ad valorem figure. We did this, using the average export unit values in dollars
for the relevant items for the two years 1964—65 and 1965—66, in column
(3). This estimate of the export unit value was multiplied by the pre-devalua-
tion rupee-dollar rate of 4.76, the pre-devaluation export duty (nil) then
being deducted therefrom to arrive in column (6) at the net f.o.b. earning (in
rupees) from the unit export of each item. The same procedure, for the post-
devaluation situation, involved multiplying these unit export values by the
post-devaluation parity rate of 7.5 and subtracting the new duties in column
(5), to arrive in column (7) at the net realization (in rupees) from the unit
export of each item after the devaluation. The proportionate increment in this
net realization from unit export, in column (8), represents, then, the estimated
ad valorein change in export incentives thanks to both the parity change and
the export duty.2
Note that the net devaluation on these export items, constituting over
60 percent of the total, was still positive. The net export incentive effect
amounted to a negative number only in the case of jute waste (which repre-
sents, however, 14—15 percent of jute exports in 1964—65 and 1965—66). We
will shortly weight the incentive changes in different exports by their export
shares. Prior to that, however, we proceed to analyze the effects of the change
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EXPORT SUBSIDIES
We have already seen that the major method of export subsidization
prior to the devaluation was the import entitlement schemes. Under these
schemes, the eligible exporters were entitled to retain a prespecified part of
their f.o.b. value of export earnings. These entitlements, given the exchange
control regime, had a market premium, so that they could be construed as
export subsidies and reduced to equivalent ad valorern rates by calculating
the proportionate increment in net realization from unit f.o.b. export earnings
that they provided.3
The diversity of the entitlement rates, as well as their variability and
plasticity in manipulation, make it nearly impossible to measure their net im-
pact on export subsidization during 1966 with any reliability. It is clear, how-
ever, that by June 1966 the import premium had risen dramatically on a num-
ber of entitlements; and premia of the order of 100 percent do not appear to
have been exceptional if we base our judgment on interviews. Indeed, in cer-
tain markets such as rayon piece goods, the premium on the entitlements was
as high as 400 percent and thereabouts by mid-1965 and until the devaluation.
In the absence of reliable data on the premium on entitlements in each
of the entitlement schemes, as of the months preceding the devaluation, we
have calculated the effective export subsidy arising fromthe different import
entitlement schemes, on the assumption of a premium on entitlements of 100
percent except in the case of engineering goods, rayon (where we reliably
know it to have been around 400 percent) and cotton textiles.4
Table 6—2 presents the calculations of the resulting export subsidy for
each scheme, stating explicitly the assumptions made regarding the entitlement
rates and the premia for the period immediately prior to the devaluation.
They also represent therefore the extent to which the elimination of these
schemes offset the devaluation. The "net" effect of the devaluation, allowing
for the removal of the entitlements, is thus given as the difference between
these estimates in column (4) and 57.5 percent, which was the formal devalu-
ation. This is recorded in column (5). It is thus clear that the devaluation was
more than offset (as of June 6, 1966) by the elimination of the entitlement
schemes On a sizable fraction of the exports in this area.
TAx CREDITS
We next make adjustment for the removal of the tax credits. Introduced
in the Finance Act, 1963, and amended through the 1964 and 1965 Finance
Acts, the pre-devaluation tax credits applied at differential rates (2—15 per-
cent) to a number of eligible industries.5 Since these were rebates on income
tax, related to f.o.b. export value, and since the tax amounted to 50 percent






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































bates was twice the stated rates. Note also that the tax credits were to be abol-
ished on both the exports which lost the entitlements and the exports on which
duties were levied with the devaluation. The net effect of the elimination of
tax credits on these industries can thus be estimated as in Table 6—3 (which
lists all the items in the import entitlement schemes and a few other minor
items as well).
CASH SUBSIDIES ON ENGINEERING GOODS
In the year preceding the devaluation, a few cash subsidies on engineer-
ing goods had been introduced at different rates. Steel carried 5percent,steel
pipes and tubes 20 percent, iron castings 4 percent, bicycles 39 percent, bi-
cycle parts 30 percent and wire nails and screws 4 percent. Between them, the
1965—66exportsof these items were only $20.2 million. The export-share
weighted average cash subsidy on engineering goods amounted to about 3.3
percent.6 In Table 6—3, we therefore adjust the entry for this item in column
(5) downward by 3.3 percent to allow for the withdrawal of these subsidies
on June 6, 1966.
OVERALL ESTIMATE OF "NET" DEVALUATION ON EXPORTS
For the items which overlap those affected by the import entitlement
schemes and the export duty changes of June 6, 1966, therefore, we can sub-
tract the estimated reduction in export subsidy due to tax-credit elimination
in Table 6—3 from the "net" devaluation estimates in Table 6—1, column (8)
and Table 6—2, column (5), respectively, to arrive at our final estimate of the
net devaluation on all these items when the export duties and removal of the
entitlements, tax credits and cash subsidies are all taken into account. These
estimates are presented in Table 6—3, column (5). The net devaluation on
exports can then be estimated as the weighted average of these net devalua-
tion rates on each of the listed items. We have weighted these rates by the
share of the exports of these items in total exports during 1964—66, to arrive
at the total figure of 21.6 percent in row (52), column (5) of Table
Invisible Earnings.
The formal devaluation changed the effective rate on all invisible earn-
ings by an identical amount with one significant exception, namely, the Na-
tional Defense Remittance (NDR) scheme which had been instituted in
October 1965 and which was formally abolished with the devaluation.
The devaluation was thus offset on remittances by the removal of the
subsidy implicit in the NDR scheme. If we take the effective subsidy via the
NDR scheme as the average of all the quotations during May, June and July















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1.Iron and steel 63.6 49.6 44.0 9.99
2.Metals other than iron







37.4 26.1 44.5 40.67
lorries and parts
thereof 78.9 63.2 43.7 3.52







































14.All others 67.0 57.1 48.3 20.26
15.Total 53.9 39.6 42.3b 100.00
SOURCES:Directorate General of Commercial Intelligence andStatistics,and
Ministry of Petroleum and Chemicals, Government of India, New Delhi.
Explanatory Memorandum to the Central Government Budget, Government of
India, New Delhi, for data on duty collections.
a. The effective duty rates reported in columns (2) and (3) are obtained by
dividing duty collection by the value of imports. Though devaluation took place on
June 6, 1966, the effective rate for the year 1965—66, ending on March 31, 1966, has
been identified with the pre-devaluation rate and that for the year 1966—67, starting from
April 1, 1966, with the post-devaluation rate. To the extent that the pre-devaluation rates
were higher than post-devaluation rates, this procedure will overstate the pre-devaluation
rates. Even though this procedure yields a weighted average rate for each group of items,
the weights are not the same in the two years—each year's rates are weighted by that
year's imports.
b. The figure in column (4)is obtained as follows:
157.5 [1 + col. (3)1•If we
[1 + col. (2)]
compute it instead as: 57.5 —leo!.(2) —col.(3)1, the total figure changes only to 43.2
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change, we then arrive at —52.5 percent as the reduction in the incentive to
remit.
Since (inward) remittances during 1964—66 were 30.8 percent of the
invisible earnings and since invisible earnings other than remitttances had not
been subsidized in any way prior to the devaluation, we can arrive at a
weighted, net devaluation figure of 25.6 percent for invisibles (earnings).
Imports.
We must now adjust the estimate of the devaluation on the side of im-
ports by netting out the effect of the reduction in import duties.
A number of tariffs were reduced at the time of the devaluation. There
were changes in standard as well as preferential tariff rates. However, data
on imports are not readily available according to the duty rates applicable.
We have therefore used the ratio of duty collected to the value of imports as
an approximate measure of effective duty rates.
We then quantify the change in the degree of effective devaluation, due
to these tariff changes by weighting the duty reductions by the share of these
items in total imports during 1964—66. We have done this in Table 6—4. The
resulting weighted-net-devaluation is 42.3 percent for imports, adjusted for
both the duty changes and the parity change.
If we bring in also the invisibles (payments), to which only the parity
change was relevant, the net devaluation figure (for the entire current account
payments) rises to 44.8 percent.
Total Net Devaluation.
The total net devaluation on the (visible) trade account therefore may
be approximated as amounting to: 21.6 percent for exports and 42.3 percent
for imports. For the entire current account (including invisibles), the esti-
mates are: 22.3 percent for receipts and 44.8 percent for payments.°
NOTES
1. Conversely, computed as the decrease in the dollar value of the rupee, the de-
valuation was 36.5 percent.
2. Remember that we are notestimatingthe net change in the incentive in1010.
Todo so we would have to allow for the effects of changes in import costs of raw ma-
terials, for example, as well as for macro-effects on the price level.
3. For a detailed discussion of these schemes and the limitations of calculating ad
valoreinrates in the manner described above, see Chapter 3. See also Bhagwati and
Desai, India, pp. 396—450.
4.Weshould warn the reader that owing to the suspension of aid, these premia98 LIBERALIZATIONEPISODE
were exceptionally high. We adjust for this fact in assessing the impact of the devaluation
on export performance, etc., in later chapters.
5. See Tables 19.7 and 19.8, Bhagwati and Desai, India, p. 433.
6. See Mark Frankena, "Export of Engineering Goods from India" (Ph.D. disser-
tation, MIT, 1971), Table 111—8, for details of these subsidies.
7. Note that we have ignored the very small entitlements that were received prior
to devaluation by some of the commodities in (1 )—(14).For example, tea had an entitle-
ment rate of 1 percent of f.o.b. value prior to devaluation. No significant error in our
estimates would occur from these procedures. We should re-emphasize, however, that
our estimates conceal much variation among individual exports within the 51 groups
listed.
8. The basic data are in Bhagwati and Desai, India, pp. 469—470.
9. In Table 6—3 we have treated all items for which no explicit export promotion
schemes were operating prior to devaluation as items for which full parity change (except
for tax credit elimination) is applicable. If we exclude these items from total exports,
the net devaluation on exports goes down to 16.9 percent and on total current account
receipts to 18.7 percent.